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Abstract
In principal-agent problems, the repetition of interactions in a dynamic setting
may alter the equilibrium outcomes. In insurance fraud, the frequency of auditor-
auditee interactions is higher when there is collusion between policyholders and
service providers (e.g., car repairers, health care providers...). The same service
provider usually handles claims filed by many policyholders affiliated to the same
insurer, and thus the insurer-service provider interactions are repeated with rep-
utation effects. We analyze this issue in a repeated game where the insurer may
potentially face a dishonest service provider who colludes with policyholders. The
insurer has beliefs about the type (honest or dishonest) of the service provider and
she may verify the truthfulness of the claim through costly audits. The reputa-
tion of the service provider corresponds to these beliefs and changes over time, and
misbehaving deteriorates this reputation. In the end, it may lead to a breach of
contract and thus represents a threat that may deter from defrauding. We show
that, at early periods, the insurer audits agents who would not be monitored in
a static setting because their reputation is good enough. Corresponding dishon-
est agents who slipped under the radar and have an initially good reputation do
not defraud systematically at early periods, as opposed to the instantaneous game.
In addition, auditing efforts for medium reputations are lower as dishonest agents
want to preserve the possibility of defrauding later. Both aspects corresponds to
a reputation-based deterrence mechanism, where the fear of deteriorating one’s
reputation acts as a discipline device for dishonest service providers.
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1 Introduction
Many principal-agent relationships have a repeated nature, and from period to period,
the principal may improve its knowledge of some hidden information of the agent. This
situation arises in many problems of fraud inspection such as, for instance, the relationship
between a firm and a subcontractor, or between a tax authority and a tax payer. In this
paper, we consider the case of insurance fraud where insurers have repeated relationships
with service providers who may be honest or dishonest.
Insurance fraud is a fundamental and complex problem for insurance markets. It
is fundamental because it heavily distorts the risk-sharing mechanisms upon which in-
surance contracts rely, and without which insurance markets might collapse. It is also
complex because auditing is motivated by mechanisms whose roles overlap and are hard
to disentangle. Is an audit revealing no fraud synonymous of failure? Or does is it just
mean it completely deters fraud? How can information acquisition still motivate an audit
if in the end deterrence is too strong to learn anything valuable?
The purpose of this paper is to combine both deterrence and informational aspects of
auditing in a single framework to analyze their interactions. To do so, we model a repeated
game between an insurer and a (honest or dishonest) auditee. The repeated character
of interactions is particularly relevant when there is collusion between policyholders and
service providers (SPs). As a single SP (e.g., car repairer or health service provider) may
serve several policyholders of the same insurer, he interacts with the latter on a frequent
basis. An SP acts as an expert who certifies1 the claim, without which a fraud cannot
occur, making an SP’s complicity a necessary condition for cheating. Honest types may
only certify invalid claims by mistake. Dishonest types on the other hand may defraud
willingly by voluntarily certifying an illegitimate claim. Auditing is only profitable when
fraudulent activity is large enough, and dishonest types rationally balance the risk of
being caught with the potential gain from fraud. This is true even in a static setting when
deterrence effects rely on the auditee’s reaction to the threat of an audit. Informational
effects come into play once interactions are repeated: based on the previous outcomes,
1i.e., that the policyholder has received a service and made a payment in return.
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the insurer has beliefs about the auditee’s type, i.e., a reputation, on which the auditing
decision depends.
Our main result shows that this combination exhibits a reputation-based deterrence
effect that is two-fold: first, the set of auditees is larger at earlier periods and includes
auditees whose reputation is good enough not to be audited in a static setting. Second,
the insurer needs to deploy less auditing efforts at earlier periods to deter auditees who
would have been audited at later ones. Interestingly, this is the result of the interaction
of two mechanisms, corresponding respectively to the deterrence and to the learning ef-
fects. With reputation effects, an auditee balances the intertemporal costs and benefits
of cheating in the present: an audit today still threatens him as before, but being caught
may also hinder the future opportunities of defrauding because the reputation worsens.
The second mechanism of the reputation-based deterrence effects relies in the discrimina-
tory power of auditing. Inspection allows the insurer to improve her information and to
better audit in the future periods, or even exclude a dishonest auditee from his affiliation
network.
These aspects relate to several strands of the academic literature. First and fore-
most, this article contributes to the literature on optimal auditing for insurance fraud.2
Following the work of Townsend (1979) and Gale & Hellwig (1985) on the Costly State
Verification approach, it considers the problem of conducting an audit when the latter is
costly. It tackles questions related to the relevance of random auditing, thus expanding
the analysis of Mookherjee & Png (1989) by conditioning the levels of auditing on the
reputation of auditees. Extending the idea of Costly State Falsification developed by
Crocker & Morgan (1998), it exhibits a form of opportunity cost for the auditee to not
defraud in order to mislead the auditor into believing he is not dishonest. More specifi-
cally, our work relates to the analysis of the different roles of auditing, besides recovering
illegitimate payments. Dionne et al. (2008) focus on auditing as a deterrence tool in a
static Stackelberg game, and show that some claims should still be audited in spite of be-
ing individually unprofitable to audit. In Aboutajdine & Picard (2018) and Aboutajdine
2Picard (2013) offers a comprehensive review of this literature.
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& Picard (2019), we consider an alternative situation where there is no deterrence3 but
the auditor can learn about the auditee’s type in a multiperiod framework. The present
article addresses the problem of combining both deterrence and information in a single
framework.
Second, an important feature of our model, namely being a repeated game with moni-
toring, relates our work to the inspection games literature (see Avenhaus et al. (2002) for
a literature review). Originally applied to arms control and disarmament, these models
have also been used for accounting and auditing problems in economics. Borch (1990)
evokes the potential application of inspection games to the economics of insurance, specif-
ically to ex-ante moral hazard problems where the insured has to take special measures to
avoid accidents. In our setting, the problem is one of ex-post moral hazard (submitting
a claim, valid or invalid, after the occurrence of a potential accident). Inspection games
have also been applied to tax evasion settings. Rubinstein (1979) examines a case where
an audit might unjustly target an honest auditee and shows that, while a one-shot game
gives no choice but to set a large penalty, a repeated game allows for a more lenient policy
that also induces the auditee to comply. Greenberg (1984) proposes an auditing scheme
where individuals are separated into different groups with different auditing levels. Audi-
tees move between groups depending on the previous cheating outcome. Another example
of repeated game where cheating history is given by Reinganum & Wilde (1986). They
apply the sequential equilibrium concept in a model where income reporting is a source
of information for the tax inspector. More recently, Varas et al. (2018) analyze a firm’s
reputation for quality problem, with an inspector who can conduct costly inspections.
Notably, in their model, monitoring plays both an incentive and an informational role.
Finally, the existence of an optimal information acquisition dimension to the insurer’s
problem relates it to the exploration/exploitation dilemma. It places our work in the
continuity of the strategic experimentation literature and bandit problems (see Berge-
mann & Va¨lima¨ki (2008)).In Aboutajdine & Picard (2019), we show that the optimal
auditing with learning but no deterrence problem is akin to a regular one-armed bandit
3i.e., the type dependent behavior of auditees is given and not affected by the risk of being spotted.
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problem where playing the risky arm corresponds to auditing, and playing the safe arm
to not auditing. This is because the auditees are non-strategic and honest and dishonest
auditees always submit a claim. In this paper, we relax both these assumptions. The un-
derlying bandit problem becomes far more complex as it involves information collection
even when no action is taken, which is related to the restless bandit literature (introduced
by Whittle (1988)). It also involves strategic arms whose rewards depend on the player’s
strategy (e.g., Braverman et al. (2017)). Both topics have been rarely tackled in the
academic literature, especially in the case of strategic armed bandits.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 char-
acterizes our main results and Section 4 shows how our problem is related to bandit
problems.Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Notations and main assumptions
We consider the relationship between an insurer (she) and a service provider (SP, he)
during T periods indexed by t = 1, ..., T . The SP is in touch with policyholders and he
certifies their claims (i.e., he asserts that he delivered the service required by the event
described in the claim, at the price reported by the policyholder). The SP may certify
at most one claim per period to the insurer (certifying more claims would signal that he
behaves in a fraudulent way). The SP may be honest or dishonest, i.e. of type H or D,
respectively, and the insurer has beliefs about the SP ’s type.
Claims are valid or invalid, and invalid claims may have been filed involuntarily (by
error) or voluntarily (by fraud). A claim is involuntary invalid when the policyholder
wrongly but honestly thought that the loss at the origin of the claim should be covered
by the insurance policy, and the service provider does not observe any wrongdoing. Claims
are voluntary invalid when the policyholder and the SP collude: the policyholder files a
claim certified by the SP in order to trigger the payment of an insurance indemnity not
included in the contractual coverage (e.g., falsifying a claim by inventing an event that did
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not occur, or misrepresenting the circumstances of this event). Honest SPs only certify
invalid claims involuntarily, while dishonest SPs may certify invalid claims knowing that
they are invalid. In short, insurance fraud takes the form of invalid claims that are
willfully transmitted to the insurer by policyholders, with the complicity of dishonest
service providers.
Let p0 and pH be the probability for an SP to certify a valid claim or to certify
involuntarily an invalid claim, whatever the SP’s type, with p0 + pH < 1. Let yt ∈ [0, 1]
the probability for a dishonest SP to wilfully certify an invalid claim at period t when
he has no claim to truthfully certify, which occurs with probability 1− p0 − pH . In what
follows, yt will be referred to as the fraud probability of a type D SP, which corresponds
to the voluntary certification of an invalid claim with probability yt(1 − p0 − pH) when
the SP is of type D. The insurer may audit a claim, which costs c to her, and we denote
xt ∈ [0, 1] the probability of auditing a claim filed at period t. Audit reveals whether the
claim is valid ot not. Usually, in the case of an invalid claim, audit does not allow the
insurer to establish whether this was intentional or unintentional, i.e., whether this was
fraud or simply an error. In both cases, no indemnity is paid to the policyholder. When
a fraudulent invalid claim is audited, the insurer may detect fraud unambiguously with
probability α ∈ [0, 1).
Remark 1. In a formally equivalent way, our model may also be interpreted as corre-
sponding to the relationship between a firm and a sub-contractor supplying spare parts,
assembled by the firm into a finished product. Each year, the firm expresses its needs
under the form of new product specifications (e.g., additional safety or quality criteria),
and the sub-contractor answers by transmitting a forecast report about expected addi-
tional costs induced by the change in product specifications. In this interpretation of the
model, p0 is the probability that the change in specifications actually induces unavoidable
additional costs. However, with probability pH the additional expected costs reported by
the sub-contractor simply reflect a misunderstanding of the firm’s requirements, or the
fact that it is unaware of costless ways to comply with the firm’s requirement (e.g., by
using different inputs or by subcontracting itself with another firm for some parts of the
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product to be supplied). Such misunderstandings may be cleared by the firm through an
audit of the sub-contractor’s report. However, the announced additional costs may also
result from the willingness of a dishonest sub-contractor to falsify its true cost, possibly
through a cost-accounting manipulation, which may be detected with probability α if the
forecast report is audited.
We wish to focus attention on the case where proving fraud is difficult, possibly
impossible, and thus we postulate that α is small, possibly zero . More precisely, we
assume
0 ≤ α < p0
p0 + pH
. (1)
Each claim corresponds to a contractual insurance indemnity I, while defrauding
costs ω to a dishonest SP. We may interpret ω as the expenses incurred by the SP and
by the policyholder to falsify the claim (i.e., to prevent the insurer to immediately detect
that the claim is invalid without any audit). Hence I − ω is the collusive gain in case
of undetected fraud, to be shared between the dishonest SP and the policyholder. For
simplicity, we assume that collusion takes the form of a take-or-leave it offer made by the
SP to the policyholder, with the whole collusive surplus I − ω being allocated to the SP,
but this is an unimportant assumption in our analysis. More importantly, we assume:
c < (1− p0)I, (2)
(p0 + pH)c > pHI. (3)
According to assumption (2), if the insurer knows with certainty that the SP is of type
D and that he systematically defrauds (i.e., y = 1), then it is profitable to audit the
claim, because the audit cost c is lower that the expected recouped indemnity (1− p0)I.
Conversely, according to assumption (3), if the insurer knows with certainty that the SP
is of type H, then it is not worthwhile to audit the claim, because the audit cost c is
larger than the expected recouped indemnity pHI/(p0 + pH) associated with involuntary
errors.
The insurer offers a multi-period contract to the SP at the beginning of period 1,
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whereby the SP is allowed to act as an insurance intermediary from t = 1 to t = T , which
consists in certifying claims filed by policyholders. At period 1, the insurer has initial
beliefs pi1 ∈ (0, 1) about the SP’s type: pi1 is the probability that the SP is of type D,
and thus 1− pi1 is the probability that he is of type H.4 At each period t = 2, ..., T , the
insurer has updated beliefs pit deduced from pit−1 and from the scenario that occurred
at period t − 1. A breach of contract takes place at the beginning of period t only if
the insurer can prove unambiguously that the SP is dishonest.5 In such a case, another
contract is offered to a new SP for the remaining periods t, t + 1, ..., T , with insurer’s
beliefs pi ∈ (0, 1) about this new SP.
For any fraudulent claim filed at period t, the expected profit of the dishonest SP
involved in the collusion is the difference between his gain I − ω if there is no audit, and
his loss ω in the case of an audit, weighted by the probabilities 1−xt and xt, respectively.
Since a type D SP defrauds with probability yt(1− p0 − pH). We may denote
Π(xt, yt) = yt(1− p0 − pH)[(1− xt)(I − ω)− xtω], (4)
his expected profit drawn from fraud at period t.
We also denote
C(xt, yt, pit) = I[p0 +K(pityt)]− xt[IK(pityt)− c(p0 +K(pityt))] (5)
the expected cost of the insurer at period t, where
K(pityt) = pH + pityt(1− p0 − pH) (6)
is the probability of an invalid claim at period t when the SP is of type D with prob-
ability pit. This probability is the sum of pH , which is the probability of an invalid
4This may correspond to the fraction of dishonest individuals in a population, in which the SP is
randomly drawn. Initial beliefs may also be affected by business references or by other signals informative
about the SP’s honesty.
5A breach of contract without evidence of dishonesty would lead to bad faith penalty imposed by a
court.
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claim transmitted by error, and of pityt(1− p0 − pH) which is the probability of a fraud-
ulent claim. The expected insurer’s cost C(xt, yt, pit) is the difference between the ex-
pected insurance indemnity I[p0 + K(pityt)] and the expected net proceeds from audit
xt[IK(pityt)− c(p0 +K(pityt))].
Five scenarios may occur at each each period t = 1, ..., T , denoted st ∈ S with
S = {AF,AI,AV,NA,NC}.
These scenarios are detailed in Table 1. The objective of the insurer is to minimize her
discounted expected cost, and the objective of a type D SP is to maximize his discounted
expected profit from fraud. We denote δ ∈ (0, 1] the discounting factor, common to the
insurer and to the SP.
Scenario Details Auditor’s Cost
AF A claim is filed, audit reveals an invalid claim, fraud is proved c
AI A claim is filed, audit reveals an invalid claim, no fraud is proved c
AV A claim is filed, audit reveals a valid claim I + c
NA A claim is filed, no audit is performed I
NC No claim is filed 0
Table 1: Possible scenarios at a given period
2.2 Definition of an equilibrium
Let ht = (s1, s2, ..., st−1) ∈ St be the history of the relationship between the insurer and
the SP before period t, with t ≥ 1. This history affects the expected profit of a type D
SP and the expected cost of the insurer only through its effect on beliefs pit. We make
the following assumptions about strategies and beliefs:
1. Strategies are Markovian: they define audit and fraud decisions at period t as
functions of the insurer’s beliefs at the same period, and they are denoted xt(pit)
and yt(pit) for all t = 1, ..., T .
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2. Beliefs pit depend on previous beliefs pit−1 and on the scenario st−1 that occurred at
the previous period, and we will write them as: pit = pit(pit−1, st−1) for all t = 2, ..., T .
Definition 1. A Markov Subgame Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (in short, an Equilib-
rium) is characterized by strategies x∗t (.) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and y∗t (.) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] for all
t = 1, ...T defining actions x∗t (pit), y
∗
t (pit) as functions of beliefs, and by belief updating
functions pi∗t (.) : [0, 1]×S → [0, 1] for all t = 2, ...T defining updated beliefs pi∗t (pit−1, st−1)
as functions of previous beliefs and previous period scenario, such that:
1. For all t = 1, ...T and all belief pit ∈ [0, 1], x∗t (pit) minimizes
Ct(xt, y
∗
t (pit), pit) = C(xt, y
∗
t (pit), pit) +
T−t∑
θ=1
δθEpit+θ
[
C(x∗t+θ(pit+θ), y
∗
t+θ(pit+θ), pit+θ)
]
,
w.r.t. xt ∈ [0, 1], where, for all θ = 1, ..., T − t, pit+θ denotes the random beliefs
deduced from strategies xt, x
∗
t+1(.), ...x
∗
T (.) and y
∗
t (.), y
∗
t+1(.), ...y
∗
T (.), and from the
belief updating functions pi∗t+1(.), ..., pi
∗
T (.).
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2. For all t = 1, ...T and all beliefs pit ∈ [0, 1], y∗t (pit) maximizes
Πt(x
∗
t (pit), yt, pit) = Π(x
∗
t (pit), yt, pit) +
T−t∑
θ=1
δθE˜˜pit+θ
[
Π(x∗t+θ(˜˜pit+θ), y∗t+θ(˜˜pit+θ), ˜˜pit+θ)],
w.r.t. yt ∈ [0, 1], where, for all θ = 1, ..., T − t, ˜˜pit+θ denote the random beliefs
deduced from strategies x∗t (.), x
∗
t+1(.), ...x
∗
T (.) and yt, y
∗
t+1(.), ...y
∗
T (.), and from the
belief updating functions pi∗t+1(.), ..., pi
∗
T (.).
3. For all t = 1, ...T and all (pit−1, st−1) that can be reached with positive probability
on the equilibrium path, the belief updating functions pi∗t (pit−1, st−1) are deduced
from strategies x∗t−1(pit−1), y
∗
t−1(pit−1) through Bayes Law when st−1 6= AF , and
pi∗t (pit−1, st−1) = pi when st−1 = AF .
6In other words, pit+θ = pi
∗
t+θ(pit+θ−1, s˜t+θ−1) for θ = 1, ..., T −t, where s˜t+θ−1 is distributed in S with
probabilities induced by strategies x∗t+θ−1(pit+θ), y
∗
t+θ−1( pit+θ) when θ = 2, ..., T − 1 and by strategies
xt, y
∗
t (pit) when θ = 1. Similarly for
˜˜pit+θ.
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Hereafter, for all t = 1, .., T , the optimized cost and payoff are defined as functions of
pit alone:
C∗t (pit) = Ct(x
∗
t (pit), y
∗
t (pit), pit) and Π
∗
t (pit) = Πt(x
∗
t (pit), y
∗
t (pit), pit).
For simplicity of comparison, we can also define their average discounted counterparts as
C
∗
t (pit) =
1∑T−t
θ=0 δ
θ
C∗t (pit) and Π
∗
t (pit) =
1∑T−t
θ=0 δ
θ
Π∗t (pit).
2.3 Instantaneous game
Let us start with the one-period model, i.e., T = 1 without repeated interaction between
insurer and SP. We refer to this case as the instantaneous game. Its equilibrium is
characterized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium of the instantaneous game (i.e., when T = 1) is given,
for an initial belief pi at the beginning of the period, by x∗1(pi) = x̂(pi), y
∗
1(pi) = ŷ(pi), where
x̂(pi) = x̂ and ŷ(pi) =
pi
pi
if pi > pi,
x̂(pi) = 0 and ŷ(pi) = 1 if pi ≤ pi,
where
pi =
(p0 + pH)c− pHI
(1− p0 − pH)(I − c) ∈ (0, 1), (7)
x̂ =
I − ω
I
∈ (0, 1). (8)
Proposition 1 is very intuitive. pi is the threshold such that, when pi < pi, there is not
enough incentives for triggering an audit, and a type D SP always defraud, i.e., x∗1(pi) = 0
and y∗1(pi) = 1. When pi > pi, a type D SP should defraud with probability less than one,
for otherwise the insurer would systematically trigger an audit. In that case, the fraud
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Figure 1: Instantaneous Equilibrium Auditing and Fraud
probability y∗1(pi) = ŷ(pi) = pi/pi ∈ (0, 1) makes the insurer indifferent between auditing
and not auditing. Symmetrically, the equilibrium audit probability x∗1(pi) = x̂ ∈ (0, 1)
makes the type D SP indifferent defrauding and not defrauding. The equilibrium is thus
in mixed strategies when pi > pi.
A simple calculation shows that the equilibrium cost of the insurer may be written as
Ĉ(pi) = C(x̂(pi), ŷ(pi), pi) =
 IJ(pi) if pi < pi,p0I2/(I − c) if pi ≥ pi, (9)
where
J(pi) = p0 + pH + pi(1− p0 − pH)
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Figure 2: Instantaneous Equilibrium Cost
or equivalently
Ĉ(pi) = C(x̂(pi), ŷ(pi), pi) = inf{IJ(pi), p0I2/(I − c)}. (10)
Hence, when pi < pi, there is no audit and the expected costs increases linearly with the
probability of a type D SP. When pi1 ≥ pi, the reputation of the SP is bad enough for
auditing with positive probability to be worthwhile, and the equilibrium expected cost
reaches an upper bound p0I
2/(I − c).
3 Reputation-based Deterrence
In the following we are interested in multiperiod settings where T ≥ 2. In Section 3.1,
we explain how the insurer refines his beliefs through Bayesian updating and how this
may induce players to deviate from the myopic strategies. We also define two types of
reputation-based deterrence effects. In Section 3.2, we solve the game for two periods and
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show that only one type of reputation-based deterrence occurs, unless fraud can be proved
unambiguously. Section 3 shows that, with three periods, both types of reputation-based
deterrence take place, regardless of the possibility to unambiguously prove fraud. Finally,
Section 3.4 gives sufficient conditions for the first type of reputation-based deterrence
effect to happen for more than three periods.
3.1 Learning and the inter-temporal threat of an audit
At the end of period t, whether a claim was submitted or not and the outcome of a
potential audit allow the insurer to refine his beliefs about the SP’s type.
If a claim was submitted and an audit reveals unambiguously that the claim was
fraudulent, the contract between the SP and the insurer is breached . In that case,
another contract is offered for period t + 1 to a new SP. Since the insurer has beliefs pi
about the type of this new SP, we have
pit+1 = pi if st = AF.
Using Bayes law yields the updated beliefs for all other scenarios for initial beliefs pit and
strategy yt ≡ yt(pit). Simple calculations yield
pit+1 = ϕAF (pit, yt) = pi when st = AF,
pit+1 = ϕAV (pit, yt) = pit when st = AV,
pit+1 = ϕAI(pit, yt) =
pit[pH + yt(1− α)(1− p0 − pH)]
pH + pityt(1− α)(1− p0 − pH) when st = AI,
pit+1 = ϕNA(pit, yt) =
pit[p0 + pH + yt(1− p0 − pH)]
p0 + pH + pityt(1− p0 − pH) when st = NA,
pit+1 = ϕNC(pit, yt) =
pit(1− yt)
1− pityt when st = NC.
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Functions ϕAI(pit, yt), ϕNA(pit, yt) are increasing and concave w.r.t. pit, and ϕNC(pit, yt)
is increasing and convex w.r.t. pit, with
ϕNC(pit, yt) < pit < ϕNA(pit, yt) < ϕAI(pit, yt), (11)
for all pit ∈ (0, 1], yt ∈ [0, 1], where the last inequality results from assumption (2).
Figure 3 plots the updating functions for low fraud (Figure 3a, yt = 0.4) and high
fraud (Figure 3b, yt = 0.8). The higher the fraud probability, the more different the
updating functions, and the more information obtained from updating. It also shows
how an SP can influence his reputation. By defrauding more, his reputation is damaged
more when caught defrauding. In other words, there is a trade-off for the SP between
immediate gains from fraud, and long-term gains from preserving his reputation.
(a) yt = 0.4 (b) yt = 0.8
Figure 3: Updating functions for (p0 = 0.2, pH = 0.1)
Definition 2 (Reputation-based fraud deterrence). In a multiperiod setting (i.e., T ≥ 2),
an equilibrium may exhibit a reputation-based fraud deterrence effect in the extensive
and/or in the intensive margins.
An equilibrium at period t exhibits a reputation-based fraud deterrence effect in the
extensive margin when there exists an interval (a, b], with a < b ≤ pi, such that x∗t (pit) > 0
and/or y∗t (pit) < 1 when pit ∈ (a, b].
An equilibrium at period t exhibits a reputation-based fraud deterrence effect in the
intensive margin when there exists an interval [d, e), with with pi ≤ d < e, such that
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x∗t (pit) < x̂ and/or y
∗
t (pit) < ŷ(pit) when pit ∈ [d, e).
In words, an equilibrium displays a reputation-based fraud deterrence effect in the
extensive margin when, at period t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}, the insurer audits claims with pos-
itive probability and/or the type D SP defrauds with probability less than one, under
beliefs pit ∈ (0, pˆi) for which there would be systematic fraud without audit at the equilib-
rium of the instantaneous game. In this case, auditing increases in the extensive margin
as SPs with priors below the instantaneous profitability threshold pi enter the auditing
pool. Alternatively, fraud decreases in the extensive margin as SPs with priors below the
instantaneous threshold pi exit the systematic fraud pool.
As can be expected from the characterization of the instantaneous game equilibrium,
when pit < pi, auditing claims cannot be profitable to the insurer if her calculation is
only based on the auditing cost at the same period. However, auditing also allows the
insurer to improve her information about the SP’s type, which may be useful to her in the
next period. The threat of being more precisely identified as a type D at the beginning
of the following period reduces the propensity of a dishonest SP to defraud, hence the
possibility of an equilibrium where there is auditing and no-systematic fraud because of
this learning process.
An equilibrium displays a reputation-based fraud deterrence effect in the intensive
margin when, at period t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}, the insurer audits claims with positive but
lower probability than the instantaneous auditing probability, and/or the type D SP
defrauds with a probability lower than the instantaneous defrauding probability. In this
case, auditing decreases in the intensive margin as the insurer needs to put in less auditing
efforts to make a type D indifferent. Alternatively, fraud decreases in the intensive margin
as a type D needs to defraud less to make the auditor indifferent.
Since optimal auditing and optimal fraud depend on the reputation pit, the evolution of
beliefs through learning may change the optimal inter-temporal auditing and defrauding
strategies. Hereafter, we will primarily focus on how the set of beliefs pit with a pure
equilibrium (x∗(pit), y∗(pit)) = (0, 1) evolves in time, i.e., on the first type of reputation-
based deterrence. In that perspective, let us define the optimal thresholds (pi∗t )t∈{1,..,T} as
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follows.
Definition 3. For any t ∈ {1, .., T}, let
pi∗t = sup {pi ∈ [0, 1]|∀µ ∈ (0, pi), (x∗t (µ), y∗t (µ)) = (0, 1)} (12)
pi∗t is the belief threshold under which there is no deterrence, i.e., the insurer does
not audit and type D SPs always defraud. In particular, at time T , pi∗T = pi. This is a
direct consequence of the fact that at the last period T , there is no subsequent period
through which learning in T might influence optimal policies, and the equilibrium is
the instantaneous one. In addition, the existence of reputation-based deterrence in the
extensive margin at time t is equivalent to having pi∗t < pi.
3.2 T = 2: Reputation-based deterrence in the intensive margin
only
To establish the possibility of such a learning-based deterrence effect, we will first consider
a two-period model, i.e., the case where T = 2. Period 2 is the last period, and thus the
equilibrium of the instantaneous game described in Proposition 1 is also an equilibrium
of at period 2. In other words, period 2 equilibrium strategies are
x∗2(pi2) = x̂(pi2),
y∗2(pi2) = ŷ(pi2),
where functions x̂(.) and ŷ(.) correspond to the definition given in Proposition 1.
In addition to the current period myopic cost, the insurer takes into account the
future cost that depends on the outcome of the current period, and on the corresponding
updating transition. Let y∗1(pi1) be the period 1 equilibrium fraud and define the period
1 thresholds piNA1 and pi
NC
1 as
ϕNA(pi
NA
1 , y
∗
1(pi
NA
1 )) = pi ϕNC(pi
NC
1 , y
∗
1(pi
NC
1 )) = pi.
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We have
piNA1 < pi < pi
NC
1 .
3.2.1 Case where unambiguously proving fraud is impossible (α = 0)
Proposition 2. When T = 2 and α = 0, the t = 1 equilibrium exhibits no reputation-
based fraud deterrence effect in the extensive margin as pi∗1 = pi. In addition, for all
priors, equilibrium fraud is the instantaneous fraud y∗1 = ŷ(pi1). However, the auditor
makes less auditing efforts for intermediate reputations pi1 ∈ (pi, piNC1 ), as x∗1(pi1) = ̂̂x on
this interval, with
̂̂x = (I − ω)(1− δ(1− p0 − pH))
I
= (1− δ(1− p0 − pH))x̂ < x̂.
Thus, we have reputation-based fraud deterrence effects in the intensive margin.
Figures 4 represent the optimal audit, fraud and average discounted cost as functions
of initial belief pi = pi1. Figure 4a shows that there is no reputation-based deterrence
in the extensive margin in the penultimate period as pi∗T−1 = pi
∗
1 = pi. On the opposite,
reputation-based fraud deterrence in the intensive margin occurs, as [d, e) = [pi, piNC1 ).
Indeed, the payoff of a type D has two components, a current period one, equivalent to the
myopic payoff, and a subsequent period one, equal to δ(1−y1)(1−p0−pH). The derivative
of the current period component is equal to 0 for x1 = x̂ from Proposition 1. Thus the
total derivative is equal to −δ(1− p0− pH), independent of x1. Consequently, for x1 = x̂,
type D’s best response is y1 = 0, and the myopic equilibrium cannot be an equilibrium at
t = 1 in (pi, piNC1 ). Figure 4b illustrates the fact that the optimal fraud level at equilibrium
does not change. Figure 4c illustrates the equilibrium optimal average discounted cost
and shows the decrease in cost thanks to the learning effect. Intuitively, this decrease
occurs for intermediate reputations (piNA1 , pi
NC
1 ) for which uncertainty reduction is the
most effective.
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(a) x∗1(pi) (b) y∗1(pi)
(c) C
∗
1(pi)
Figure 4: Audit, fraud and average discounted cost at (t, T ) = (1, 2)
3.2.2 Case where it may be possible to unambiguously prove fraud (α > 0)
Before considering a T = 3 setting, we focus on the case where fraud can be proven
unambiguously, i.e., α > 0.
Proposition 3. When T=2, the equilibrium exhibits a reputation-based fraud deterrence
effect in the extensive margin when α > 0 and pi < pˆi.
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In other words, the proof of Proposition 3 shows that there is an interval (piα1 , pi)
where y∗1(pi) < 1 and x
∗
1(pi) > 0, meaning auditing to trigger deterrence effects is an
equilibrium strategy, while there would have been no equilibrium auditing in this same
interval in a purely instantaneous setting. This is a very intuitive result: when there
is a positive probability to unambiguously detect fraud, the possibility to replace the
defrauder by another SP with better reputation provides an additional incentive to audit
claims at period 1. This creates a credible threat for type D SPs, and consequently fraud
is reduced and auditing occurs with positive probability for some pi1 smaller than pˆi.
3.3 T = 3: Reputation-based deterrence in the extensive and
the intensive margins
As for Section 3.2, it will be useful to define some thresholds. First, because of the
notation, the first period from the T = 2 case becomes the second one, and the previous
thresholds are now denoted piNA2 and pi
NC
2 . Let y
∗
1(pi1) be the period 1 equilibrium fraud
when T = 3 and define the period 1 thresholds piNA1 and pi
NC
1 as
ϕNA(pi
NA
1 , y
∗
1(pi
NA
1 )) = pi
NA
2 ϕNC(pi
NC
1 , y
∗
1(pi
NC
1 )) = pi
NC
1 .
We have
piNA1 < pi
NA
2 < pi < pi
NC
2 < pi
NC
1 .
Proposition 4. Assume pi < pi,and
p0 + pH <
1− pi
2− pi , (13)
1−
√
c
I
<
I − c
2I − c. (14)
Then, for T = 3, the t = 1 equilibrium exhibits a reputation-based fraud deterrence effect
in the extensive margin regardless of α as pi∗1 < pi.
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Condition (13) is a sufficient condition for the proposition to hold. It is made to make
the proof easier, but it is not necessary. It may be interpreted as an assumption about
the importance of fraud: the probability that a type D is in a position to defraud is
1− p0− pH , and according to (13), this probability should be larger than 1/(2− pi). (14)
is a condition on I and c under which (2), (3) and (13) are compatible. Contrary to
Proposition 3, it is valid also when α = 0.
(a) x∗(pi) (b) y∗(pi)
(c) C
∗
t (pi)
Figure 5: Audit, fraud and average discounted cost at (t, T ) = (1, 3)
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Figures 5 represent simulation7 results for the optimal audit, fraud and average dis-
counted cost at the first period when there are three periods in total. Figure 5a shows
that there is some reputation-based deterrence in the first period as pi∗T−2 = pi
∗
1 < pi. .
Figure 5b shows that the optimal fraud level decreases in comparison to the instanta-
neous benchmark on the interval (pi∗1, pi
NC
2 ) as a result of this reputation-based deterrence
effect. Figure 5c illustrates the equilibrium optimal average discounted cost and shows
the decrease in cost thanks to the accumulation of learning in time. Notably, the set of
beliefs for which a decrease occurs is larger in the first period (green curve) than in the
second/penultimate period.
Therefore, both types of reputation-based deterrence effects come into play. First, for
priors in the interval [pi, piNC1 ), auditing is lower than in the myopic equilibrium. More
specifically, in the interval [pi, piNC2 ), fraud is also lower than in the myopic equilibrium.
Both situations correspond to reputation-based deterrence in the intensive margin. Strik-
ingly, the simulation results indicate that the mixed equilibrium auditing may drop to
0 above pi.Second, for priors in the interval (pi∗t+1, pi], there is a mixed equilibrium with
some fraud and non systematic deterrence. This is a reputation-based deterrence effect
in the extensive margin, whereby priors (pi∗t+1, pi] are included in the auditing set while
they are not in the myopic equilibrium.
The proof relies on a very intuitive approach, where we look, for a prior pi0T−2 < pi
and close enough to pi, at a difference in costs ξ(pi0T−2). This quantity is the difference
between the auditor’s cost under myopic strategies (xT−2, yT−2 = (0, 1)) and the cost the
auditor deviates to systematic auditing ((xT−2, , yT−2) = (1, 1).
ξ(pi0T−2) = ∆C + δ∆EΨT−1 + δ2∆EΨT , where pi0T−2 −→ pi−.
The first term is the difference between both strategies in the instantaneous costs, the
second the proceeds from T −1 and the last one the proceeds from T . Figure 6 plots each
component to compare them in the vicinity of pi. The only term that is positive, i.e., for
7For (p0, pH , c, I) = (0.3, 0.15.0.44, 1). Assumptions (2),(3),(13) and (14) are compatible for these
values.
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which a deviation towards systematic auditing is unprofitable, is the current period term.
The two other terms are, as shown in the proof, negative. Remembering the definition of
pi in equation (7), this is the prior that equalizes auditing and not auditing instantaneous
costs. Therefore, ∆C tends to 0 when the prior gets closer to pi. However this is not
sufficient to trigger auditing below pi: ∆EΨT−1, the difference in costs between auditing
and not auditing in the intermediary period T − 1 is smaller in absolute value than ∆C
(see Figure 6b). The T−1 term, as a term that account for information gains, is negative,
but also tends towards 0 when approaching pi. This is why there is no reputation-based
deterrence effect below pi at T = 2. Finally, including a third period adds the ∆EΨT
term to the balance. This term is negative, but does not tend to 0 at pi (see green line in
Figure 6a).
(a) Period 1, 2 and 3 costs (b) Period 1 and 2 costs (zoom)
Figure 6: Multi-period costs in the vicinity of pi
Let us again think about the situation under scrutiny through the lens of deviation
towards total auditing, i.e., x = 1. Figure 7 plots the period 1 average discounted cost
under the second period equilibrium actions (x∗2, y
∗
2). It also plots the period 1 average
discounted cost under a deviation from the previous action consisting in systematically
auditing. We see that this deviation becomes profitable above pi∗1, hence the reputation-
based deterrence effect. Note also the discontinuity of the blue curve, i.e., under a myopic
equilibrium, at the prior pi. This is because auditing, which means resorting with prob-
ability x∗1 > 0 to transitions ϕAI and ϕAV instead of ϕNA, becomes profitable at soon as
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pi > pi∗1, but does not come into play until pi. When it does all of a sudden, the related
cost saving makes the cost curve discontinuous.
Figure 7: C1(x1, y1, pi) for T = 3
3.4 Multiperiod setting
In a multiperiod setting where T ≥ 3, Proposition 5 shows that if the horizon is far enough
and the insurer is patient enough, reputation-based fraud deterrence in the extensive
margin takes place.
Proposition 5. For an arbitrary number of periods T , there is reputation-based deter-
rence if the remaining relationship is long enough, i.e., for t such that
(1− p0 − pH)δ(1− δ
T−t)
1− δ > 1,
which is true for T − t large enough, provided the auditor is patient enough
δ >
1
2− p0 − pH .
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In words, for δ large enough, a type D SP whose reputation is just below the threshold
pi will have an incentive to deviate from the instantaneous equilibrium ŷ(pi − ) = 1 if
T − t is large enough. Intuitively, if the auditor never audits in the neighborhood just
below pi and expects a type D to systematically defraud, then not observing a claim
leads him to believe once and for all that the scrutinized auditee is of type H. In this
context, by deviating, an auditee of type D will masquerade as a type H for the remaining
of the relationship and defraud systematically with no fear of being audited. These
future accumulated profits are increasing with the number of remaining periods and the
discounting factor, which explains the existence of thresholds in the proposition. In other
words, the threat of a future audit deters fraud at the beginning of the relationship.
4 Auditing with Deterrence and Learning Effects and
the Restless Bandit Problem
In this section, we provide a short description of the relationship between our auditing
problem and the restless bandit problem. We leave a formal resolution of the problem
for future work. We also set aside the strategic arms aspect.
A fundamental assumption in the regular bandit literature is that the reward associ-
ated to each arm only evolves if the arm is chosen. In Aboutajdine & Picard (2019), this
was true because not auditing had an updating function equal to the identity function.
In this paper, not auditing corresponds to the updating functions ϕNA and ϕNC , which
means that an arm (an SP) not played (audited) still sees the associated belief evolve.
This is due to the difference in claim submission between types. A type D submits valid
and mistakenly invalid claims with the same probability as a type H, but the type D
also voluntarily submits invalid claims, which means he submits more claims on average
than the type H. Therefore, even without auditing, observing a claim indicates that an
SP is more likely to be of type D.
This is an important aspect as we can no longer rely on an optimal stopping formu-
lation of the problem. Even if the belief drops below the threshold pi∗t , auditing does not
stop and may resume if the belief goes back above the threshold through non auditing
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based updating.
(a) Example 1 (b) Example 2 (c) Example 3
Figure 8: Belief trajectories for a type D under myopic strategies
(a) Example 1 (b) Example 2 (c) Example 3
Figure 9: Belief trajectories for a type H under myopic strategies
Figures 8 and 9 show simulations of the trajectories of beliefs for a type D and a type
H under myopic strategies at all periods, but with updating. Although not realistic, as
an insurer who updates beliefs cannot plausibly use myopic strategies, these examples
still illustrate the ideas above. In Figure 8a, the belief converges to the true one, even
after starting below the threshold. In addition, beliefs in Figures 8b and 8c do cross
the threshold more than once before converging to the true belief. In the case of a type
H, once he reaches the zone where no auditing is conducted below the threshold, it is
sufficient for him to not claim once to see his belief become equal to 0, the true belief.
However, as shown by the random draw in Figure 9b, if a claim is submitted right after
entering the no auditing zone, the SP’s belief remains strictly above 0. In addition, these
trajectories are obtained under myopic strategies when type D SPs and the insurer do
not adapt their behavior earlier in the relationship. Therefore, there is no guarantee that
the true beliefs 0 and 1 will be the only stationary points asymptotically.
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Therefore, our dynamic auditing problem with deterrence and learning is related to a
complex class of bandit problems where the reward distribution of non-played arms still
evolves and arms adapt to the player’s strategy.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the insurance fraud problem when the auditor faces strategic au-
ditees with a reputation. The objectives of auditing are threefold: recovering illegitimate
claims, deterring fraud and learning about auditees’ types, and their effects overlap. The
main result of our paper is that the combination of information learning by auditing and
strategic behavior of auditees produces a reputation-based deterrence effect as a result of
their interaction.
An important but ambitious extension of our analysis would be to approach it as
a bandit problem, but, as discussed in the last section of the paper, the problem is
particularly complex. One possibility would be to decompose the problem and start with
an intermediary setting. Going back to the model of Aboutajdine & Picard (2019), one
could relax only the assumption of having both types submit exactly one claim per period,
and keep auditees non-strategic. Then, our problem would be a restless bandit problem,
without strategic arms.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Under an audit strategy x1(.), the best response y1(pi1) of a type D SP under
insurer’s belief pi1 is obtained by maximizing Π(x1(pi1), y1, pi1) w.r.t. y1 ∈ [0, 1], which
gives
y1(pi1) = 1 if (I − ω)[1− x1(pi1)]− ωx1(pi1) > 0, (15)
y1(pi1) ∈ [0, 1] if (I − ω)[1− x1(pi1)]− ωx1(pi1) = 0, (16)
y1(pi1) = 0 if (I − ω)[1− x1(pi1)]− ωx1(pi1) < 0. (17)
Under a fraud strategy y1(.), the best response x1(pi1) of the insurer under belief pi1 is
obtained by minimizing C(x1, y1(pi1), pi1) w.r.t. x1 ∈ [0, 1], which gives
x1(pi1) = 1
if c[p0 + pH + pi1y1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)]− I[pH + pi1y1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)] < 0 (18)
x1(pi1) ∈ [0, 1]
if c[p0 + pH + pi1y1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)]− I[pH + pi1y1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)] = 0, (19)
x1(pi1) = 0
if c[p0 + pH + pi1y1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)]− I[pH + pi1y1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)] > 0. (20)
If x1(pi1) = 1, then (17) gives y1(pi1) = 0. Using (3) and (20) yields x1(pi1) = 0, hence
a contradiction. Thus, we have x1(pi1) < 1. In other words, systematic auditing cannot
be an equilibrium outcome.
If x1(pi1) ∈ (0, 1), then (16) gives y1(pi1) = ŷ(pi1), with ŷ(pi1) ∈ (0, 1) if pi1 > pi, and
ŷ(pi1) = 1 if pi1 ≤ pi. Using (15) and (16) gives x1(pi1) = x̂ ∈ (0, 1) when ŷ(pi1) ∈ (0, 1),
i.e., when pi1 > pi, and x1(pi1) ≤ x̂ when ŷ(pi1) = 1, i.e., when pi1 = pi. Hence, there exists
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a mixed equilibrium where no player audits or defrauds with certainty, such that
x∗1(pi1) = x̂ ∈ (0, 1) and y∗1(pi1) = ŷ(pi1) ∈ (0, 1) if pi1 > pi,
Finally, if x1(pi1) = 0, then (15) gives y1(pi1) = 1, and (20) is satisfied if pi1 ≤ pi. Hence
there exists an equilibrium such that
x∗1(pi1) = 0 and y
∗
1(pi1) = 1 if pi1 ≤ pi.
Patching up these cases yields the characterization provided in Proposition 1.
A.2 Joint proof of Propositions 2 and 3
Proof. Assume pi < pi. Let piAI(pi1, y1), piNA(pi1, y1) and piNC(pi1, y1) defined by
ϕAI(piAI , y1) = pi,
ϕNA(piNA, y1) = pi,
ϕNC(piNC , y1) = pi,
with
piAI(pi1, y1) < piNA(pi1, y1) < pi < piNC(pi1, y1),
for all pi1, y1.
Consider period 1 equilibrium strategies x∗1(pi1) and y
∗
1(pi1). Let us denote K
∗(pi1) ≡
K(pi1y
∗
1(pi1)) and
∆ =
p0I
2
(I − c) − IJ(pi),
with ∆ > 0 from pi < pi.
According to initial beliefs pi1, five possible cases have to be distinguished.
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Figure 10: Proof cases
Case 1 : pi1 is such that piNA(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) < pi1 < pi.
In the case of an audit when a claim is filed, we have
pi2 = pi1 < pi with prob.
p0
p0 +K∗(pi1)
, (21)
pi2 = pi < pi with prob.
αpi1y
∗
1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
, (22)
pi2 = ϕAI(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) > pi with prob.
K∗(pi1)− αpi1y∗1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
. (23)
If there is no audit, we have
pi2 = ϕNA(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) > pi. (24)
The insurer chooses x1 in [0, 1] in order to minimize
C(x1, y
∗
1(pi1), pi1) + δEpi2 [C(x∗2(pi2), y∗2(pi2), pi2]
= C(x1, y
∗
1(pi1), pi1) + δEpi2C(x̂(pi2), ŷ(pi2), pi2).
Using (9) and (21)-(24) shows that x1 minimizes
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I + x1
[
c− I K
∗(pi1)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
]
+ δx1
[
p0
p0 +K∗(pi1)
IJ(pi1)
+
αpi1y
∗
1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
IJ(pi) +
K∗(pi1)− αpi1y∗1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
× p0I
2
I − c
]
+δ(1− x1) p0I
2
I − c,
in [0, 1]. Since the function to be minimized is linear w.r.t. x1, we deduce
x1

= 1
∈ [0, 1]
= 0
if [p0 +K
∗(pi1)]c− IK∗(pi1) + δp0
[
J(pi1)I − p0I
2
I − c
]
+δαpi1y
∗
1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)[IJ(pi)−
p0I
2
I − c ]
< 0
= 0
> 0
.
This gives
x1

= 1
∈ [0, 1]
= 0
if y∗1(pi1)
>
=
<
f(pi1) (25)
where
f(pi1) =
k
pi1
[pi − η(pi − pi1)] , (26)
and
k =
I − c
I − c+ δα∆ ∈ (0, 1],
η =
δp0I
I − c ∈ (0, 1)
with f ′(pi1) < 0 and f(pi) < 1 if α > 0 and f(pi) = 1 if α = 0, because k < 1 when α > 0
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and k = 1 when α = 0. Note also that f(pi∗∗) = 1 with
pi∗∗ = pi
I − c− δp0I
I − c− δp0I + δα∆ = pi
k(1− η)
k(1− η) + 1− k , (27)
and pi∗∗ < pi if α > 0, and pi∗∗ = pi if α = 0.
Consider now the optimal choice of a type D SP (in the case where he has the
opportunity to certify a fraudulent claim, which occurs with probability 1 − p0 − pH).
Let EF
[
Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)] and EN [Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)] be the period 2 expected fraud
profit of a type D SP in case of fraud or no-fraud at period 1 respectively. Here ˜˜pi2
denotes period 2 beliefs in each case (fraud F and no fraud N), and these beliefs depend
on initial beliefs pi1, on the type D SP strategy y
∗
1(pi1), and on s1. For beliefs and
equilibrium strategies such that piNA(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) < pi1 < pi, if the SP defrauds, we have
˜˜pi2 =

ϕAI(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) > pi in the case of an audit without
unambiguous proof of fraud,
ϕNA(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) > pi if there is no audit.
In both case, the SP’s expected profit at period 2 is zero. This is also the case, it an
audit provides an unambiguous proof of fraud. Hence, we have
EF
[
Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)] = 0.
If the type D SP does not defraud, no claim is filed and thus, we have
˜˜pi2 = ϕNC(pi1, y∗1(pi1)) < pi,
which gives
EN
[
Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)] = (1− p0 − pH)(I − ω).
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Hence, at period 1, the type D best response is given by maximizing
y1
{
[1− x∗1(pi1)]I − x∗1(pi1)ω + δEF
[
Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)]− δEN [Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)]} ,
w.r.t. y1 in [0, 1], which gives
y1

= 1
∈ [0, 1]
= 0
if [1− x∗1(pi1)](I − ω)− x∗1(pi1)ω − δ(1− p0 − pH)(I − ω)
< 0
= 0
> 0
,
or equivalently
y1

= 1
∈ [0, 1]
= 0
if x∗1(pi1)
<
=
>
x∗∗, (28)
with
x∗∗ =
(1− δ(1− p0 − pH))(I − ω)
I
∈ (0, 1). (29)
Suppose x∗1(pi1) = 1. Then (25) gives y
∗
1(pi1) ≥ f(pi1) > 0, and (39) implies x∗1(pi1) ≤
x∗∗ < 1, hence a contradiction. If x∗1(pi1) = 0, then (25) gives y
∗
1(pi1) ≤ f(pi1) < 1,
and (39) gives x∗1(pi1) ≥ x∗∗ > 0, which once again is a contradiction. Hence, we have
x∗1(pi1) ∈ (0, 1), and (25) implies y∗1(pi1) = f(pi1), with pi∗∗ ≤ pi1 < pi. When pi∗∗ < pi1 < pi,
we have y∗1(pi1) = f(pi1) ∈ (0, 1), and (39) gives x∗1(pi1) = x∗∗ ∈ (0, 1). When pi1 = pi∗∗, we
have y∗1(pi1) = f(pi1) = 1, and (39) gives x
∗
1(pi1) ≤ x∗∗.
Such an equilibrium exists if ϕNA(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) < pi1 < pi or, equivalently, if ϕNA(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) >
pi and pi1 < pi. This is equivalent to
pi∗NA < pi1 < pi,
where
pi∗NA = pi
[
1− k(1− pi)(1− p0 − pH)
p0 + pH + kη(1− pi)((1− p0 − pH)
]
< pi.
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Hence, an equilibrium exists with x∗1(pi1) = x∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) and y∗1(pi1) = f(pi1) ∈ (0, 1) if
sup{pi∗NA, pi∗∗} < pi1 < pi, which requires α > 0. Everything else given, we have pi∗NA <
pi∗∗, when k is small enough, which corresponds to α small. If α = 0 and x∗1(pi1) > 0, we
would have y∗1(pi1) ≥ f(pi1) > 0 if pi1 < pi, hence a contradiction.Thus, we have x∗1(pi1) = 0
and y∗1(pi1) = 1 when α = 0.
Case 2 : pi1 is such that piAI(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) < pi1 < piNA(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)).
In the case of an audit when a claim is filed, we have
pi2 = pi1 < pi with prob.
p0
p0 +K∗(pi1)
, (30)
pi2 = pi < pi with prob.
αpi1y
∗
1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
, (31)
pi2 = ϕAI(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) > pi
with prob.
K∗(pi1)− αpi1y∗1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
. (32)
If there is no audit, we have
pi2 = ϕNA(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) < pi. (33)
In this case, the insurer chooses x1 in [0, 1] in order to minimize
I + x1
[
c− I K
∗(pi1)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
]
+ δx1
[
p0
p0 +K∗(pi1)
IJ(pi1)
+
αpi1y
∗
1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
IJ(pi) +
K∗(pi1)− αpi1y∗1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
× p0I
2
I − c
]
δ(1− x1)IJ(ϕNA(pi1, y∗1(pi1)),
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in [0, 1]. We deduce
x1

= 1
∈ [0, 1]
= 0
if [p0 +K
∗(pi1)]c− IK∗(pi1) + δI[pH(1− p0 − pH)
−K∗(pi1)I(1− p0)− c
I − c − α∆pi1y
∗
1(pi1)(1− p0 − pH)]
< 0
= 0
> 0
.
This gives after simplification
x1

= 1
∈ [0, 1]
= 0
if y∗1(pi1)
>
=
<
g(pi1) (34)
where
g(pi1) =
k
pi1
[
p0pi + ηpH(pi − pi1)
p0 + kη(1− p0 − pH)(1− pi)
]
, (35)
with g′(pi1) < 0. Note that
f(pi∗NA) = g(pi
∗
NA) =
kpi(p0 + pH)
p0 + pH − k(1− η)(1− pi)(1− p0 − pH) ,
which corresponds to the continuity between cases 1 and 2 at pi1 = pi
∗
NA. Reasoning
as in Case 1 shows that when α > 0 there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies
x∗1(pi1) = x∗∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) and y∗1(pi1) = g(pi1) ∈ (0, 1) if sup{pi∗AI , pi∗∗∗} < pi1 < pi∗NA and
pi∗NA < pi∗∗, where pi
∗
AI and x∗∗∗ are defined by piAI(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) = pi , or equivalently
ϕAI(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) > pi, and by g(pi∗∗∗) = 1, respectively. x∗∗∗ is the audit probability that
makes the type D SP indifferent between defrauding or not-defrauding.
Case 3 : pi1 is such that pi1 < piAI(pi1, y1).
Straight forward calculation shows that x∗1(pi1) = 0 and y
∗
1(pi1) = 1 in that case. This
case holds when pi1 < sup{pi∗AI , pi∗∗∗}.
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Case 4 : pi is such that pi < pi1 < piNC(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)).
When α = 0, in the case of an audit when a claim is filed, we have
pi2 = pi1 > pi with prob.
p0
p0 +K∗(pi1)
, (36)
pi2 = ϕAI(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) > pi with prob.
K∗(pi1)
p0 +K∗(pi1)
. (37)
If there is no audit, we have
pi2 = ϕNA(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)) > pi. (38)
In this case the type D chooses y1 in [0, 1] in order to maximize
y1
{
[1− x∗1(pi1)]I − x∗1(pi1)ω + δEF
[
Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)]− δEN [Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)]} ,
w.r.t. y1 in [0, 1], which gives
y1

= 1
∈ [0, 1]
= 0
if [1− x∗1(pi1)](I − ω)− x∗1(pi1)ω − δ(1− p0 − pH)(I − ω)
< 0
= 0
> 0
,
or equivalently
y1

= 1
∈ [0, 1]
= 0
if x∗1(pi1)
<
=
>
̂̂x, (39)
with ̂̂x = (I − ω)(1− δ(1− p0 − pH))
I
= (1− δ(1− p0 − pH))x̂ ∈ (0, 1). (40)
Consider now the optimal choice of the insurer. She has to minimize
C(x1, y
∗
1(pi1), pi1) + δEpi2 [C(x∗2(pi2), y∗2(pi2), pi2] = C(x1, y∗1(pi1), pi1) + δ
[ p0I2
I − c
]
.
The second period cost is independent of x1. Indeed, all outcomes NA,AV and AI lead
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to posteriors larger than pi. Therefore, the insurer is made indifferent for the myopic
fraud level ŷ(pi1) =
pi
pi1
∈ (0, 1).
For α = 0, the equilibrium in Case 4 is then given by
x∗1(pi1) =
(I − ω)(1− δ(1− p0 − pH))
I
< x̂ and y1(pi1) =
pi
pi1
.
Case 5 : pi is such that pi1 > piNC(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1)).
In this case, all priors in period 2 obtained from pi1 through updating are larger than
pi. Then the expectation of period 2 cost is known and independent of x1
Epi2 [C(x∗2(pi2), y∗2(pi2), pi2] =
p0I
2
I − c.
The type D has to maximize
y1
{
[1− x∗1(pi1)]I − x∗1(pi1)ω + δEF
[
Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)]− δEN [Π(x̂(˜˜pi2), ŷ(˜˜pi2), ˜˜pi2)]} ,
where the period 2 terms are all equal to zero since all updated beliefs are larger than
pi. Therefore, the period 1 equilibrium audit and fraud are the myopic ones, for beliefs
larger than piNC(pi1, y
∗
1(pi1))
x∗1(pi1) = x̂ =
I − ω
I
and y∗1(pi1) = ŷ(pi1) =
pi
pi1
.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Let T = 3. We already know that the proposition is valid when α > 0, and thus
we may restrict the proof to the case α = 0. Let
Ψ(pi) = inf{IJ(pi), p0I2/(I − c)}.
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Ψ(pi) is the expected cost of the insurer at the equilibrium of the instantaneous game,
under beliefs pi. Hence,
C(x∗T (piT ), y
∗
T (piT ), piT ) = Ψ(piT ),
for all piT in [0, 1], since T is the last period of the game. Furthermore, when α = 0, the
equilibrium strategies of period T −1 also coincide with those of the instantaneous game,
with
C(x∗T−1(piT−1), y
∗
T−1(piT−1), piT−1) = Ψ(piT−1),
for all piT−1 in [0, 1].
Assume
x∗T−2(piT−2) = x̂(piT−2), (41)
y∗T−2(piT−2) = ŷ(piT−2), (42)
for all piT−2 ∈ [0, 1]. Let pi0T−2 ∈ (0, pi), pi0T−2 close to pi. (41) and (42) imply
x∗T−2(pi
0
T−2) = 0,
y∗T−2(pi
0
T−2) = 1.
Consider a deviation of the insurer’s strategy from x∗T−2(pi
0
T−2) = 0 to xT−2(pi
0
T−2) = 1.
Let ΨNT−1 and Ψ
A
T−1 denote the insurer’s expected cost at period T − 1 for beliefs pi0T−2,
if she does not deviate (No audit) and if she deviates (Audit) at period T − 2.
Consider first the case where the insurer does not deviate from her equilibrium strategy
x∗T−2(pi
0
T−2) = 0. We have
piT−1 = 0 with prob. (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH), (43)
piT−1 = ϕNA(pi0T−2, 1) > pi with prob. 1− (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH), (44)
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and thus
EΨNT−1 = I(p0 + pH)(1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)
+
p0I
2
I − c [1− (1− pi
0
T−2)(1− p0 − pH)],
where the expected value of the insurer’s cost is conditional on period T − 2 belief pi0T−2.
When the insurer deviates from her equilibrium strategy to xT−2(pi0T−2) = 1, we have
piT−1 = 0 with prob. (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH), (45)
piT−1 = pi0T−2 with prob. p0, (46)
piT−1 = ϕAI(pi0T−2, 1) > pi with prob. 1− (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)− p0, (47)
and thus
EΨAT−1 = I(p0 + pH)(1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)
+Ip0[p0 + pH + pi
0
T−2)(1− p0 − pH)]
+
p0I
2
I − c [1− (1− pi
0
T−2)(1− p0 − pH)− p0].
We deduce
∆EΨT−1 ≡ EΨAT−1 − EΨNT−1 = −p0I(1− p0 − pH)(pi − pi0T−2). (48)
Consider now the strategies played at period T following either an audit or no audit at
period T − 2, and denote ΨAT and ΨNT the corresponding expected costs.
Suppose first that no audit has been performed at period T −2. Consider the two cases
that may occur.
If piT−1 = 0, we have piT = 0, and thus
E[ΨNT (piT ) | piT−1 = 0] = I(p0 + pH). (49)
40
If piT−1 = ϕNA(pi0T−2, 1), we have
piT ≥ ϕsT−1(ϕNA(pi0T−2, 1), ŷ(ϕNA(pi0T−2, 1)), (50)
in all scenarios sT−1 that may occur at period T − 1. Note that
ϕNA(pi, 1) =
pi
p0 + pH + pi(1− p0 − pH)
and thus
ϕsT−1(ϕNA(pi, 1), ŷ(ϕNA(pi, 1)) = ϕsT−1
(
ϕNA(pi, 1),
pi
ϕNA(pi, 1)
)
= pi
1− p0 − pH
pi + (1− pi)(p0 + pH)
> pi,
where the inequality results from (13). Consequently, we have
ϕsT−1(ϕNA(pi
0
T−2, 1), ŷ(ϕNA(pi
0
T−2, 1)) > pi, (51)
when pi0T−2 is close to pi. Hence, (44) and (45) show that piT > pi when pi
0
T−2 is close to pi,
in all possible scenarios following piT−1 = ϕNA(pi0T−2, 1).
Consequently, we have
E[ΨNT (piT ) | piT−1 = ϕNA(pi0T−2, 1)] =
p0I
2
I − c, (52)
and using (43),(44),(49) and (52) gives
EΨNT = (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)(p0 + pH)I
+[1− (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)]
p0I
2
I − c,
where the expected value of the insurer’s cost at period T is conditional on beliefs pi0T−2.
Suppose now that an audit has been performed at period T − 2. Consider the three
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cases that may occur.
If piT−1 = 0, as in the previous case we have piT = 0, and
E[ΨNT (piT ) | piT−1 = 0] = I(p0 + pH). (53)
If piT−1 = pi0T−2, then using x
∗
T−1(pi
0
T−2) = x̂(pi
0
T−2) = 0 and y
∗
T−1(pi
0
T−2) = ŷ(pi
0
T−2) = 1
gives
piT = 0 with prob. (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH),
piT = ϕNA(pi
0
T−2, 1) > pi with prob. 1− (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH).
If piT−1 = ϕAI(pi0T−2, 1), we have ∆
piT ≥ ϕst(ϕAI(pi0T−2, 1), ŷ(ϕAI(pi0T−2, 1)), (54)
in all scenarios sT−1 that may occur at period T − 1. Since ϕAI(pi0T−2, 1) > ϕNA(pi0T−2, 1),
using (13) yields piT > pi in all scenarios that may occur at period T − 1, following
piT−1 = ϕAI(pi0T−2, 1). Hence, we have
EΨAT = (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)(p0 + pH)I
+p0
[
(1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)(p0 + pH)I
+[1− (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)]
p0I
2
I − c ]
]
+[1− (1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)]
p0I
2
I − c.
We obtain
∆EΨT ≡ EΨAT − EΨNT = p0(1− pi0T−2)(1− p0 − pH)
×
[
(p0 + pH)I − p0I
2
I − c
]
= −p0Ipi(1− p0 − pH)(1− pi0T−2). (55)
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Finally, a deviation from x∗T−2(pi
0
T−2) = 0 to xT−2(pi
0
T−2) = 1 induces a change ∆C in
insurance cost at period T − 2 defined by
∆C = C(1, 1, pi0T−2)− C(0, 1, pi0T−2)
= cp0 − (I − c)[ph + (1− p0 − pH)pi0T−2],
where cp0 is the expected audit cost for valid claims and (I− c)[ph+ (1−p0−pH)pi0T−2] is
the expected value of recouped indemnities, net of audit cost, for detected invalid claims.
Let
ξ(pi0T−2) = ∆C + δ∆EΨT−1 + δ2∆EΨT ,
the discounted expected variation in the insurer’s cost after the deviation. We have ∆C →
0 and ∆EΨT−1 → 0 when pi0T−2 → pi, and thus ξ(pi0T−2)→ −δ2p0Ipi(1−p0−pH)(1−pi) < 0
when pi0T−2 → pi, which shows that the deviation is profitable to the insurer when pi0T−2 is
close to pi.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Assume there exists t ≥ 1 such that y∗t,T (pit) = 1 for pit ∈ [pi − , pi] ≡ A where  > 0.
Assume an SP of type D with reputation pit has no legitimate claim to channel and either
defrauds with certainty (yt,T = 1) or does nothing (yt,T = 0). If the SP deviates and
yt,T = 0, then, by Bayes law, pit+1 = 0 and he will be able to defraud in all subsequent
periods without being auditied (since x∗t,T = 0 at any time t). Denoting EF [V (pit+1)|pit]
and EN [V (pit+1)|pit] the time t discounted expected gain over periods t, t + 1, .., T of a
type D with reputation pit who respectively defrauds (F, yt,T = 1) or does not defraud
(N,yt,T = 0), for pit ∈ [pi − , pi], we then have
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EN [V (pit+1)|pit] = (I − ω)(1− p0 − pH)
T−t∑
i=1
δi
= (I − ω)(1− p0 − pH)δ(1− δ
T−t)
1− δ , (56)
If the type D SP chooses to defraud with yt,T = 1, then pit+1 = ϕNA(pit, 1) with probability
(1− x∗t,T (pit,T )) and pit+1 = ϕAI(pit, 1) with probability (x∗t,T (pit,T )). Therefore pit+1 > pi in
both cases for  small enough. Then, at period t+ 1, the equilibrium is a mixed one and
the SP of type D is indifferent between defrauding or not. So the optimal expected gain
at time t + 1 is obtained by looking at total fraud yt,T = 1. In particular, if he defrauds
with certainty when given the chance at all subsequent periods, his priors pit+i will always
increase and stay above pi. Therefore, the SP no longer has any expected gain starting
from period t+ 1 if he defrauds with certainty at period t. Then
EN [V (pit+1)|pit,T ] = (I − ω)(1− x∗t,T (pit,T ))− ωx∗t,T (pit)
≤ (I − ω), (57)
Equations (56) and (57) imply that a sufficient condition for
EN [V (pit+1)|pit] > EF [V (pit+1)|pit],
is given by
(1− p0 − pH)δ(1− δ
T−t)
1− δ > 1,
which is true for T − t large enough if
δ >
1
2− p0 − pH .
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